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Abstract 
Although the allocative efficiency benefits of competition are a tenet of microeconomic theory, the 
relation between competition and technical efficiency is less well understood.  Neoclassical 
models of profit-maximization subsume static cost-minimizing behavior regardless of market 
competitiveness, but agency models of managerial behavior suggest possible scope for 
competition to influence cost-reducing effort choices.  This paper explores the empirical effects of 
competition on technical efficiency in the context of electricity industry restructuring.  
Restructuring programs adopted by many U.S. states made utilities residual claimants to cost 
savings and increased their exposure to competitive markets.  We estimate the impact of these 
changes on annual generating plant-level input demand for non-fuel operating expenses, the 
number of employees and fuel use.  We find that municipally-owned plants, whose owners were 
for the most part unaffected by restructuring, experienced the smallest efficiency gains over the 
past decade.  Investor-owned utility plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity 
markets had the largest reductions in nonfuel operating expenses and employment, while investor-
owned plants in nonrestructuring states fell between these extremes.  The analysis also highlights 
the substantive importance of treating the simultaneity of input and output decisions, which we do 
through an instrumental variables approach. 
 
JEL Codes: L11, L43, L51, L94, D24 
Keywords: Efficiency, Production, Competition, Electricity restructuring, Electric 
Generation, Regulation
  
Economists have long argued that competition generates important efficiency benefits for an 
economy.  These generally focus on allocative efficiency; the implications of competition for 
technical efficiency are less clear.  Neoclassical models of profit-maximization subsume static 
cost-minimizing behavior by all firms, regardless of market competitiveness.1  Agency models, 
however, in recognizing the interplay of asymmetric information with the separation of 
management and control, suggest possible deviations from cost-minimization by effort-averse 
managers.  These models may imply a role for competition in constraining managerial behavior, 
by rewarding efficiency gains and confronting less-efficient firms with the choice of cost 
reduction to the level of their lower-cost counterparts or exit; see Nickell (1996) for a brief 
discussion of some of these theoretical arguments.   Their actual relevance is ultimately an 
empirical question. 
 
This paper assesses the effect of competition on technical efficiency using data on the U.S. 
electric generation sector.  The past decade has witnessed a dramatic transformation of this 
industry.  Until the mid-1990s, over ninety percent of the electricity in the US was sold by 
vertically-integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs), most operating as regulated monopolists 
within their service areas.  Today, non-utility generators own roughly a quarter of generation 
capacity nationwide, and IOUs in many states own only a small fraction of total generating 
capacity and operate in a partially deregulated structure that relies heavily on market-based 
incentives or competition.  While studies of state-level electricity restructuring suggest politicians 
may have been motivated in large part by rent-seeking (e.g., White, 1996, and Joskow, 1997), 
many proponents of restructuring argued that exposing utilities to competitive, market-based 
outcomes would yield efficiency gains that could ultimately reduce electricity costs and retail 
prices.  Research on other industries suggests productivity gains associated with deregulation 
(e.g.,  Olley and Pakes, 1996, on telecommunications and Ng and Seabright, 2001, on airlines) 
and with increased competitive pressure caused by factors other than regulatory change (e.g., 
Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz, 2002, on iron ore mines).2
 
 
                                                 
1 The implication of competition for dynamic efficiency through innovation is the subject of an extensive 
theoretical and empirical literature in economics, dating at least from Schumpeter’s 1943 classic 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 
 
2 Some hint of this possibility in electricity is provided by Primeaux (1977), who compared a sample of 
municipally owned firms facing competition to a matched sample of municipally owned firms in monopoly 
situations and found a significant decrease in costs per kWh for firms facing competition. 
1 
The considerable body of academic work on electricity restructuring within the U.S. and abroad 
has thus far focused on assessing the performance of competitive wholesale markets, with 
particular attention to the exercise of market power (see for example Borenstein, Bushnell and 
Wolak, 2002 and Joskow and Kahn, 2002).   While many of the costs of electricity restructuring 
have been intensively studied, relatively little effort has been devoted to quantifying any ex post 
operating efficiency gains of restructuring, although a few studies (e.g., Knittel, 2002) have 
analyzed efficiency effects of various incentive regulations in this sector.3  This study provides 
the first substantial analysis of early generation efficiency gains of electricity restructuring.  As 
such, it contributes to the broad economic debate on the role of competition in the economy and 
is of direct policy relevance to states contemplating the future of their electricity restructuring 
programs.   
 
The results of this work indicate that plant operators most affected by restructuring reduced labor 
and nonfuel expenses, holding output constant, by roughly 5% or more relative to other investor-
owned utility (IOU) plants, and by 15-20% relative to government- and cooperatively-owned 
plants, which were largely unaffected by restructuring incentives.  These may be interpreted as 
the medium-run efficiency gains that Joskow (1997, p. 214) posits “may be associated with 
improving the operating performance of the existing stock of generating facilities and increasing 
the productivity of labor operating these facilities.”  Our work also highlights the importance of 
treating the simultaneity of input and output choice.   Failing to recognize that shocks to input 
productivity may induce firms to adjust targeted output leads to overstatement of estimated 
efficiency effects, in some cases by a factor of two or more.  While endogeneity concerns have 
been long recognized in the productivity literature, ours is one of the first studies of electric 
generation to compensate for this.  Finally, we explore the sensitivity of the estimated efficiency 
impact to the choice of control group to which restructured plants are compared, and discuss the 
issues involved in determining the appropriate counterfactual. 
  
                                                 
3 One exception is Hiebert (2002), who uses stochastic frontier production functions to estimate generation 
plant efficiency over 1988-1997.  One set of independent variables he includes is indicators for regulatory 
orders or legislative enactment of restructuring reforms in 1996 and in 1997.  While he finds significant 
reductions in mean inefficiency associated with restructuring laws in 1996 for coal plants, he finds no 
effects for gas plants, nor for either fuel type in 1997.  Our work uses a longer time period, richer 
characterization of the restructuring environment and dating of reforms consistent with the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, and an alternative technology specification that allows for more complex 
productivity shocks and treats possible input endogeneity biases.  Joskow (1997) describes the significant 
labor force reductions that accompanied restructuring in the UK, as the industry moved from state-owned 
monopoly to a privatized, competitive generation market, although these mix restructuring and 
privatization effects.   
2 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes existing evidence on the 
competitive effects of efficiency, and discusses how restructuring might alter electric generation 
efficiency.  Section 2 details our empirical methodology for testing these predictions, and 
describes our strategy for identifying restructuring effects.  The data are described in Section 3.  
Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Why Might Restructuring Affect Generator Efficiency? 
 
Exit by less-efficient firms is a well-understood efficiency benefit of competition:  as output shifts 
from (innately) higher-cost firms to lower-cost competitors the total production cost for a given 
output level decline.  Olley and Pakes (1996) provide empirical evidence of this phenomenon in 
their plant-level analysis of the magnitude and source of productivity gains in the U.S. 
telecommunications equipment industry over 1974-1987.  They find substantial increases in 
productivity associated with the increased competition that followed the 1984 divestiture and 
deregulation in this sector, and identify the primary source of these gains as the re-allocation of 
output from less productive to more productive plants across firms.  In a similar vein, Syverson 
(2004) finds that more competitive local markets in the concrete industry are associated with 
higher mean, less dispersion, and higher lower-bounds in plant productivity, effects he attributes 
to the exit of less-efficient plants in more competitive environments.  
 
The existing evidence on whether competition also leads to cost reductions through technical 
efficiency gains by continuing producers and plants is relatively sparse.  Nickell (1996) uses a 
panel of 670 U.K. manufacturing firms to estimate production functions that include controls for 
the competitive environments in which firms operate.  He finds some evidence of reduced 
productivity levels associated with market power and strong support for higher productivity 
growth rates in more competitive environments.  Concerns about the ability of cross-industry 
analysis to control adequately for unobservable heterogeneity across sectors may make sector-
specific evidence tighter and more convincing.4  A notable example is the Galdón-Sánchez and 
Schmitz (2002) study of labor productivity gains at iron ore mines that faced increased 
competitive pressure following the collapse of world steel production in the early 1980s.  They 
find unprecedented rates of labor productivity gains associated with this increase in competitive 
                                                 
4 A number of studies have analyzed efficiency gains following regulatory reform in various industries; 
see, for example, Bailey’s (1986) overview and Park et al. (1998) on airlines.  Unfortunately, in many 
cases it is difficult to disentangle direct regulatory effects on efficiency (e.g., operating restrictions imposed 
on trucking firms or airlines by regulators in those sectors) from the indirect effects of reduced 
competition.  
  
3 
pressure, “driven by continuing mines, producing the same products and using the same 
technology as they had before the 1980s” (Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz, 2002, p. 1233).5
 
Several features of the electric generation sector make it an attractive subject for testing potential 
competitive effects on technical efficiency.6  First, generation technology is reasonably stable and 
well-understood and data on production inputs and outputs at the plant-level are readily available 
to researchers.  This has made electric generation a common application for new production and 
cost function estimation techniques, dating at least to Nerlove (1963).  Second, policy shifts over 
a relatively short period have resulted in a dramatic transformation of the market for electric 
power.  Through the early 1990s, the U.S. electricity industry was dominated by vertically 
integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs).  Most operated as regulated monopolists over 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity within their localized geographic market, 
though there was some wholesale power traded among utilities or purchased from a small but 
growing number of non-utility generators.  Prices generally were determined by state regulators 
based on accounting costs of service at the firm level.  By 1998, every jurisdiction (50 states and 
the District of Columbia) had initiated formal hearings to consider restructuring their electricity 
sector, and by 2000, almost half had approved legislation introducing some form of competition 
including retail access.7  This provides both time series and geographic variation in competitive 
environments.  Third, static and dynamic efficiency claims bolstered much of the policy reform; 
measuring these benefits is a vital prerequisite to assessing the wisdom of these policies. 
 
It has long been argued that traditional cost-of-service regulation does relatively well in limiting 
rents but less well in providing incentives for cost-minimizing production; see Laffont and Tirole 
(1993).  Under pure cost-of-service regulation, regulator-approved costs of the utilities are passed 
directly through to customers, and reductions in the cost of service yield at most short-term 
profits until rates are revised to reflect the new lower costs at the next rate case.8  Given 
asymmetric information between regulators and firms, inefficient behavior by managers that 
raises operations costs above minimum cost levels generally would be reflected in increased rates 
                                                 
5 Ng and Seabright (2001) estimate cost functions for a panel of U.S. and European airlines over 1982-
1995, and conclude that potential gains from further privatization and increased competition among 
European carriers are substantial, though they point out that the best-measured component of these gains 
relates to ownership rather than market structure differences. 
6 Understanding possible reallocation of output across plants is hampered by the exit of plants from most 
available databases when they are sold to non-utility owners. 
7 In the aftermath of California’s electricity crisis in 2000-2001, restructuring has become less popular and 
many states have delayed or suspended restructuring activity, including six that had previously approved 
retail access legislation.  See US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2003. 
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and passed through to customers.  Joskow (1974) and Hendricks (1975) demonstrate that frictions 
in cost-of-service regulation, particularly those arising from regulatory lag (time between price-
resetting hearings), may provide some incentives at the margin for cost-reducing effort.  Their 
impact generally is limited, however, apart from periods of rapid nominal cost inflation (see 
Joskow, 1974).    
 
This system led economists to argue that replacing cost-of-service regulation with higher-
powered regulatory incentive schemes or increased competition could enhance efficiency.9  Over 
the 1980s and early 1990s, many state utility commissions accordingly adopted some form of 
incentive regulation.  The limited empirical evidence available on these reforms, which modify 
price setting within the regulated monopoly structure, suggests mixed results.  Knittel (2002) 
studies a variety of incentive regulations in use through 1996, and finds that those targeted at 
plant performance or fuel cost were associated with gains in plant-level generation efficiency.10  
More general reforms, such as price caps, rate freezes, and revenue-decoupling programs, 
typically were associated with insignificant or negative efficiency estimates, all else equal.   
 
Restructuring, in contrast to incentive regulations, fundamentally changed the way plant owners 
earn revenue.  At the wholesale level, plants sell either through newly created spot markets or 
through long-term contracts that are presumably based on expected spot prices.  In the spot 
markets, plant owners submit bids indicating the prices at which they are willing to supply power 
from their plants.  Dispatch order is set by the bids, and, in most markets, the bid of the marginal 
plant is paid to all plants that are dispatched.  High-cost plants will be forced down in the dispatch 
order, reducing likely revenue.  Plant operators that reduce costs move higher in the dispatch 
order, increasing dispatch probability, and increase the profit margin between own costs and the 
expected market price.  Most restructuring programs also changed the way retail rates are 
determined and the way in which retail customers are allocated.11   Retail access programs in 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Rates are constant between rate cases, apart from certain specific automatic adjustments (such as fuel 
adjustment clauses), so changes in cost would not be reflected in rates until the next rate case.  
9 See, for example, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, for a theoretical justification, or Joskow and Schmalensee, 
1987, for an applied argument. 
10 Knittel uses OLS and stochastic production frontier techniques to estimate Cobb-Douglas generating 
plant production functions in capital, labor, and fuel for a panel of large IOU plants over 1981-1996.  His 
results from first-differenced models, which implicitly allow for plant-level fixed efficiency effects, 
suggest gains on the order of 1-2% associated with these reforms. Equations that do not allow for plant 
fixed effects suggest much larger magnitudes. 
11 States have used a variety of approaches to link retail rates under restructuring to wholesale prices in the 
market.  Over the short term, most states decoupled utility revenue from costs by mandating retail rate 
freezes, often at levels discounted from pre-restructuring prices.  Some states, such as Pennsylvania, are 
aggressively trying to encourage entry by competitive energy suppliers, who may contract directly with 
retail customers. 
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combination with the creation of the new wholesale spot markets may increase the intensity of 
cost-cutting incentives, leading to even greater effort to improve efficiency.   
 
While the most significant savings from restructuring are likely to be associated with efficient 
long-run investments in new capacity, there may be opportunities for modest reductions in 
operating costs of existing plants (see Joskow, 1997).  This paper attempts to measure the extent 
of that possible improvement for the existing stock of electricity generating plants in the U.S.  
The implicit null hypothesis is that, before restructuring, operators were minimizing their costs, 
given the capital stock available in the industry.  Under the null, there should be no change in 
plant-level efficiency measures associated with restructuring activity.  We discuss below our 
method for estimating plant efficiency and identifying deviations from this hypothesis.  Assessing 
the effects of restructuring requires specification of how generating plants would have been 
operated absent the policy change.  Constructing this counterfactual is crucial, but difficult.  
 
2. Empirical Model 
 
For a single-output production process, productive efficiency can be assessed by estimating 
whether a plant is maximizing output given its inputs and whether it is using the best mix of 
inputs given their relative prices.  Production functions describe the technological process of 
transforming inputs to outputs and ignore the costs of the inputs; a plant is efficient if it is on the 
production frontier.  Cost minimization assumes that, given the input costs, firms choose the mix 
of inputs that minimizes the costs of producing a given level of output.  A plant could be 
producing the most output possible from a given input combination, but not minimizing costs if, 
for instance, labor was cheap relative to materials, yet the plant used a lot of materials relative to 
labor.  Even if the firm were producing the maximum output possible from its workers and 
materials, it would not be efficient if it could produce the same level of output less expensively 
by substituting labor for materials.  We explore the impact of restructuring on efficiency by 
specifying a production function and then deriving the relevant input demand equations implied 
by cost minimization. 
 
We adopt the convention of representing generating plant output (Q) by the net energy the 
generating units produce over some period (measured by annual megawatt-hours, MWh, in our 
data), a choice that is discussed in further detail in the data section below.  While a multitude of 
studies of electric plant productivity model this output as a function of current inputs, often using 
a Cobb-Douglas production or cost function, the characteristics of electricity production argue 
strongly for an alternative specification.  We derive a model of production and cost minimization 
6 
that is sensitive to important institutional characteristics of electricity production that have been 
largely ignored in the earlier literature. 
 
First, observed output in general will be the lesser of the output the plant is capable of producing, 
given its available inputs, and the output called for by the system dispatcher.  Because the system 
dispatcher must balance total production with demand at each moment, the gap between probable 
(QP) and actual (QA) output for a given plant i will be a function of demand realizations, the set of 
other plants available for dispatch, and plant i’s position in the dispatch order.12  
 
Second, while fuel inputs are varied in response to real-time dispatching and operational changes, 
other inputs to a plant’s production are determined in advance of output realizations.  Capital 
typically is chosen at the time of a unit’s construction (or retirement), and at the plant level is 
changed relatively infrequently.  From the manager’s perspective, it may be considered a fixed 
input.  Utilities hire labor and set operating and materials expenditures in advance, based on 
expected demand.  While these can be adjusted over the medium-run, staffing decisions as well as 
most maintenance expenditures are not tied to short-run fluctuations in output.13  We therefore 
treat these as set in advance of actual production, and determining a target level of probable 
output, QP.   
 
Finally, while labor, materials, and capital may be to some extent substitutable to produce 
probable output, the generation process generally does not allow these inputs to substitute for fuel 
in the short-run.  Given this description of the technology, we posit a Leontief production process 
for plant i in year t of the following form: 
 
QitA = min[ g(Eit, Γ E, εitE ),  QitP(Ki, Lit, Mit, Γ P, εitP)·exp(εitA))] 
 
where QA is actual output and QP is probable output; inputs are denoted by E for energy (fuel) 
input, K for capital, L for labor, and M for materials; Γ denotes parameter vectors, and ε denotes 
unobserved (to the econometrician) mean zero shocks.  See Van Biesebroeck (2003) for the 
derivation of a similar production function he uses to model automobile assembly plant 
production.  
                                                 
12 Random shocks to a plant’s operations, such as unexpected equipment failures or equipment that lasts 
longer than expected, will cause it to produce less or more than its probable output from a set of available 
inputs. 
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 As noted above, fuel input decisions are made in real time, after the manager has observed any 
shocks associated with the plant’s probable output productivity, εitP, the actual operation of the 
plant, εitA, and the plant’s energy-specific productivity in the current period, εitE .  Probable 
output, QP, is in contrast determined by input decisions made in advance of actual production.  
We assume that capital, measured by the nameplate generating capacity of the plant, is fixed.14  
Labor and materials decisions are made in advance of production, but after the level and 
productivity of the plant’s capital is observed.  This reflects the quasi-fixity of these inputs over 
time:  staffing decisions and maintenance plans are designed to ensure that the plant is available 
when it is dispatched, based on the targeted output QP.  The error term εitP incorporates 
productivity shocks that we assume are known to the plant manager in advance of scheduling 
labor and materials inputs, but are not observable to the econometrician.   We allow actual output 
to differ from probable output by a multiplicative shock exp(εitA), assumed to be observed at the 
time fuel input choices are made but not known at the time probable output is determined.  This 
shock would be, for example, negative if a generating unit were unexpectedly shut down due to a 
mechanical failure, or positive if the plant were run more intensively than anticipated, as might be 
the case if a number of plants ahead of it in the usual dispatch order were unavailable or demand 
realizations were unexpectedly high.   
 
We model probable output (QP) with a Cobb-Douglas function of labor and materials and 
embedding capital effects in a constant (Q0(K)) term.  This yields the specification: 
 
(PF1)  QitP ≤ Q0(Ki)·(Lit)γL·(Mit)γM· exp(εitP)  
 
In preliminary analysis, we estimated the parameters of the production function, including terms 
that allowed for differential productivity under restructuring.  Those results suggested 
productivity gains associated with restructuring.  The work reported here imposes an additional 
constraint, based on cost-minimization, to estimate input demand functions, and isolate possible 
restructuring effects on each measured input.  A cost-minimizing plant manager, facing wages Wit 
and material prices Sit, would solve for the optimal inputs to produce probable output QitP by: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 In fact, over a short time period, maintenance and repair expenditures will be inversely related to output 
since the boiler needs to be cool and the plant offline for most major work.  We deal with this potential 
simultaneity bias below. 
14 The empirical analysis defines a new plant-epoch, i, whenever there are significant changes in capacity, 
so that within each plant-epoch, capacity is approximately constant. 
8 
 min  Wi t·Li t + Si t·Mi t                 s.t.  Qi tP ≤ Q0(Ki)·(Li t)γL·(Mi t)γM·exp(εi tP) 
            Li t, Mi t
 
yielding the following factor demand equations: 
 
(L1)  Li t = (λγL QitP)/Wi t 
(M1)   Mi t = (λγM QitP)/Si t 
 
where λ is  the Lagrangian on the production constraint.   
 
We observe actual output, QitA = QitPεitA, rather than probable output, QitP.  Making this 
substitution and taking logs of both sides, (L1) becomes:  
 
(L2) ln(Li t) = α0 + ln(Qi tA) – εi tA – ln(Wi t  )  
 
where α0 = ln(λγL).    If there are differences across plants, over time, or across regulatory regimes 
in the coefficients of the production function (γL) or in the shadow value of the probable output 
constraint (λ), or if there is measurement error in labor used at the plant, this equation will hold 
with error.  As we are particularly interested in changes in input demand associated with 
restructuring, we expand the subscript it to irt to include plant i in year t, and regulatory 
restructuring regime r, and re-write (L2) as: 15  
 
(L2’) ln(L irt) = ln(Q irt A) – ln(W irt ) + αiL + δtL  + φ r L  – ε irt A + εir tL 
 
where αiL measures a plant-specific component of labor demand, δtL captures year-specific 
differences in labor demand, φ r L captures restructuring-specific shifts in labor demand, and εirtL 
measures the remaining error in the labor input equation. α0 is now subsumed in the plant-specific 
demand, αiL.  Note that φ r L picks up mean residual changes in labor input for a plant in a 
restructured regime relative to that plant overall and to all other plants at the same point in time.  
It could reflect systematic changes in the marginal productivity of labor (γL), in the shadow value 
of the availability constraint (λ) or in optimization errors. 16
                                                 
15 Note that many plant-level differences, such as capital stock, and many time-varying shocks, such as 
technology-neutral productivity shocks, drop out of this equation through the conditioning on output 
choice. 
16 If there were systematic differences in the relation of probable and actual output across restructuring, γ r L 
may also reflect the change in mean ε irt A.   Since ε irt A reflects shocks unobservable by the firm when 
setting planned output, it seems plausible that these be mean zero in expectation, but their realizations 
could be nonzero in the restructuring sample we observe. 
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 Similarly, equation (M1) becomes: 
 
(M2)   ln(Mirt) = ln(QrtA) – ln(Srt ) + αiM + δtM  + φ r M  – ε irt A + ε ir tM 
     
which is directly analogous to (L2’). 
 
We model the energy component of the Leontief production function, which will in general hold 
with equality, as: 
 
(PF2)   QirtA = g(Eirt, γE, εE)  
 
Assuming that g(•) is monotonically increasing in E, we can simply invert it to get an expression 
for E in terms of Q.  Note that the price of fuel does not enter into the demand for fuel except 
through the level of output the plant is dispatched to produce.  For consistency with the other 
input specifications, we specify a log-log relationship: 
 
(E1)  ln(Eirt) = γQE ·ln(Qirt) + φ r E   + αiE  +  δtE + εirtE
 
where as before, the plant-specific error, αiE,  the year-specific error,  δtE , and the restructuring-
specific  term, φ r E , capture systematic changes in the efficiency with which plants convert 
energy to electricity—that is, changes in plant heat rates—across plants, over time, or correlated 
with restructuring activity, respectively. 
 
We confront two important endogeneity concerns in estimating the basic input demand equations, 
(L2’), (M2) and (E1).  The first is the possibility that shocks (ε ir tL, ε ir tM, εirtE) in the input demand 
equations may be correlated with output.  If output decisions are made after a plant’s manager 
observes the plant’s efficiency, managers may increase planned output in response to positive 
shocks to an input’s productivity, or reduce planned output in response to negative shocks.  This 
behavior would induce a correlation between the error in the input demand equation and observed 
output.  Though one can control directly for plant-specific efficiency differences and for secular 
productivity shocks in a given year, idiosyncratic shocks remain a source of possible bias.   
Second, the estimates may be subject to selection bias if exit decisions are driven by unobserved 
productivity shocks.  In this case, negative shocks could lead to plant shutdown, implying that the 
10 
errors for observations we observe will be drawn from a truncated distribution.  Neither of these 
problems is unique to our setting, and they have been raised in many earlier papers.17  
 
Consider first the simultaneity issue.  We face a potential simultaneity problem if, for instance, a 
malfunctioning piece of equipment reduces the plant’s fuel efficiency, leading the utility to 
reduce its operation of that plant and consequently to use less fuel.  There may be deviations from 
predetermined employment and materials budgets caused by unanticipated breakdowns that 
require increased use of labor and repair expenditures and result in lower output.  A positive 
efficiency shock to an input may lead managers to run that plant more intensively over the year, 
increasing output as well as input use.   A variety of methods have been used to address this 
concern.18  We choose to use an instrumental variables approach, using a measure of state-level 
electricity demand as an instrument for plant output.  This is likely to be highly correlated with 
the amount of output a plant will be called to provide, but uncorrelated, for instance, with how 
efficiently an individual plant’s feedwater pumps are working.  This approach is likely to be 
particularly effective for the energy equation, given the responsiveness of energy input choices to 
demand fluctuations in real time, and for identifying exogenous output fluctuations at non-
baseload plants, which are more strongly influenced by marginal swings in demand.  It may be 
less powerful in identifying variation in ex ante labor and maintenance choices, depending in part 
on the extent to which plant managers anticipate state demand.19  We therefore explore the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative instruments. 
 
The potential selection issue is more difficult to address.  The plants in our sample seem more 
stable than those studied in many other contexts (especially see Olley and Pakes, 1996), 
suggesting that the selection problem may be somewhat less severe for electric generation.  
However, plant exit increases in restructuring regimes, typically not because the plant is retired 
but because divestitures remove the plants from the reporting database.  To the extent that the 
divestitures are mandated by the restructuring legislation, this should not create selection 
problems.  But without better information on what determines discretionary divestitures, we have 
                                                 
17 Nerlove (1963) provides an early discussion of simultaneity bias in production functions.  Olley and 
Pakes (1996) propose a structural approach to addressing simultaneity, which is compared to alternatives in 
Griliches and Mairesse (1998).  Ackerberg and Caves (2003) discuss this issue and compare treatments 
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  While many papers have estimated 
production or cost functions for electric generating plants, from the classic analyses in Nerlove (1963) and 
Christensen and Greene (1976) to very recent work such as Kleit and Terrell (2001) and Knittel (2002),  
electricity industry studies typically have not treated either simultaneity or selection problems.  
18 See the references cited in note 17, supra. 
19 A further drawback to this instrument is that we measure demand only at the state, rather than plant 
level, which means that we do not use the cross-plant variation within a state to identify output coefficients. 
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no direct way to assess their impact on the results.  One indirect way to assess the significance of 
potential selection effects is to compare results for the unbalanced panel we use in most of our 
work to those for a panel of plants that continue to operate through the end of our sample period, 
for which potential selection effects are likely to be most severe.  Substantial differences across 
those results may suggest the need to more carefully treat potential selection biases. 
 
Identification strategy 
 
There is substantial heterogeneity across plants, utilities and states, and the economic 
environment in which utilities operate has changed considerably over time.  In addition, 
restructuring is not randomly assigned across political jurisdictions—earlier work suggests that it 
is strongly correlated with higher than average electricity prices in the cross-section.20  
Fortunately, we have in this sector a database rich in variation.  There are thousands of generating 
plants operated by hundreds of utilities subject to regulation by dozens of political jurisdictions 
each setting their own legal and institutional environment.  Panel data on the costs and operations 
of these plants are available, with some recent exceptions, from well before any restructuring 
until the present.21  This allows us to construct benchmarks that we believe control for most of the 
potentially confounding variation. 
 
The plant-specific effects, {αiN}, measure the mean use of input N at plant i relative to other 
plants in the sample.  These effects may be associated with differences in plant technology type 
and vintage, ownership (government v. private utilities), and time-invariant state effects.  The 
year-specific shock, {δtN}, measures the efficiency impact of sector-level shifts over time, such as 
secular technology trends, macroeconomic fluctuations or energy price shocks.  Restructuring 
effects on plant productivity correspond to a non-zero {φrN}.  The heterogeneity in the timing and 
outcomes of state-level restructuring activity allow the data to distinguish between temporal 
shocks and restructuring effects.  While all states held hearings on possible restructuring, the 
earliest was initiated in 1993 and the latest in 1998.  There is considerable variation in the 
outcome of those hearings, as well, with just under half the jurisdictions (23 states and the District 
of Columbia) enacting restructuring legislation between 1996 and 2000.22  The remainder 
                                                 
20 The significant role of sunk capital costs in regulatory ratemaking means that high prices do not 
necessarily imply high operating costs for generation facilities within a state, however.  See Joskow (1997) 
for a discussion of the contributors to price variation across states. 
21 Cost data are not publicly available for plants owned by exempt wholesale generators, including those 
acquired from regulated utilities. 
22 We collected information on state restructuring legislation from various Energy Information 
Administration and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners publications and state 
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considered and rejected, or considered and simply did not act on, such legislation.  This variation 
allows us to use changes in efficiency at plants in states that did not pass restructuring legislation 
to identify restructuring separately from secular changes in efficiency of generation plants over 
time. 
 
It is possible that plants in this control group also altered their behavior over the post-1992 
period.  This could be due perhaps to the introduction or intensification of incentive regulation 
within states that did not enact restructuring, to the expectation of potential restructuring that did 
not occur, or spillovers from restructuring movements in other states (e.g. if regulators updated 
their information about the costs necessary to run plants of a certain type, or multi-state utilities 
operating under differing regimes improved efficiency of all their plants, not just those in 
restructuring states).  To the extent this occurs, our comparison will understate the magnitude of 
any efficiency effect of restructuring.    
 
We therefore consider a second control group, consisting of cooperatively-owned or publicly-
owned municipal and federal plants, which for convenience we will refer to as “MUNI” plants, 
although the group is broader than strictly implied by this label.   An extensive literature has 
debated the relative efficiencies of private and public ownership in this sector under traditional 
regulation, with somewhat mixed results.  We abstract from that by allowing for plant-specific 
effects that absorb any levels differences in input use across ownership type.  Restructuring 
generally altered the competitive environment only for private investor-owned utilities within a 
state, leaving those for publicly- and cooperatively-owned utilities unchanged.23  This suggests 
that MUNIs may provide a second benchmark against which to measure changes in efficiency 
associated with restructuring.  We adopt a parameterization that measures {φrN} relative to 
publicly-owned plants during the period that investor-owned utilities are at risk of restructuring, 
defined as 1993 forward.   Using N to denote input (labor, nonfuel expenses, or fuel), and 
PRICEN  to denote the relevant input price (none for the fuel equation), we have input use 
equation I1: 
 
(I1)  ln(Nirt) = ln(QirtA) - ln(PRICENirt ) + γMUNIit +   αiN + δtN  + φir N  – ε irt A + ε ir tN 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
public utility commission websites.  Since 2000, no additional states have enacted restructuring legislation, 
and several have delayed or suspended restructuring activity in response to the California crisis. 
23 With the exception of Arizona and Arkansas, which included government-owned utilities in restructuring 
programs. 
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This specification implicitly provides two “non-treatment groups” to which investor-owned 
plants in restructuring regimes may be compared:  investor-owned plants in non-restructuring 
regimes (with the restructuring effect measured by φ r N), and public- and cooperatively-owned 
plants over 1993-1999 (with the restructuring effect measured by φ r N - γ). 
 
 
3. Data & Summary Statistics 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on annual generating plant-level data for U.S. electric utilities.  
Plants are comprised of at least one, but typically several, generating units, which may be added 
to or retired from service over the several-decade life of a typical generating plant.  While an 
ideal data set would allow us to explore efficiency at the generating unit level, inputs other than 
fuel are not available at the generating unit level, and some, such as employees, are not even 
assigned to the unit level as they are shared across units at the plant.24  We therefore use a plant-
year as an observation. 
 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) collects data for investor-owned utility 
plants annually in the FERC Form 1, and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Rural 
Utilities Service (RUS) collect similar data for municipally-owned plants and rural electric 
cooperatives, respectively.  These data include operating statistics such as size of the plant, fuel 
usage, percentage ownership held by the operator and other owners, number of employees, 
capacity factor, operating expense, year built, and many other plant-level statistics.  Our base data 
set includes all large steam and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generating plants for which 
data were reported to FERC or EIA over the 1981 through 1999 period.25  We excluded smaller 
plants, defined as those for which gross capacity exceeded 100 megawatts for fewer than three of 
our sample years.  We also excluded approximately 1,500 observations where data were missing, 
and dropped several hundred observations based on regression diagnostic tests to screen for 
outliers or undue influence.  Further details on the data are provided in the Appendix. 
 
We follow the literature in characterizing output by the total energy output of the plant over the 
year, measured by annual net megawatt-hours of electricity generation, NET MWhs.  This is an 
imperfect choice.  Output is, in reality, multidimensional, although most dimensions are not 
                                                 
24 Some labor may be shared across multiple plants, though assigned to one particular plant in our data.  
This will lead induce measurement error, particularly in the plant employment variable. 
25 One unfortunate consequence of restructuring is that available data on plants sold by utilities to non-
utility generators are extremely limited after the sale, due to changed reporting requirements.  This means 
that plants will be excluded from the dataset after such sales. 
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recorded in the plant data.  For example, generating plants may also provide reliability services 
(such as spinning reserves, when the plant stands ready to increase output at short notice), voltage 
support and frequency control.  While the production process varies considerably across these 
different outputs, only net generation is well measured in the data.26  Moreover, electricity output 
is not a homogenous product.  Because electricity is non-storable, electricity produced at 5PM on 
the first Friday in July is a separate output from electricity produced at 5AM on the second 
Sunday in March.  Firms must decide how to balance the costs associated with taking their plant 
down to do maintenance against the probability that a poorly maintained plant will fail during 
peak demand hours, and the availability of the plant may be an important modifier of output 
quality.  Changes in incentives associated with restructuring may have altered firms’ assessments 
of these tradeoffs, although the expected direction of the effects is theoretically ambiguous.27  
Hourly output prices and output from individual plants might allow us to better assess this.  
Lacking such data, we rely on a single output dimension, but acknowledge its limitations. 
 
We have information on three variable inputs.  The first, EMPLOYEES, is a count of full-time 
employees at the plant.   The second, NONFUEL EXPENSE, includes all non-fuel operations and 
maintenance expenses, such as expenses for coolants, maintenance supervision and engineering 
expenses.  This variable is less than ideal as a measure of materials, both because it reflects 
expenditures rather than quantities, and because it includes the wage bill for the employees 
counted in EMPLOYEES, although that expense is not separately delineated in our data.   As 
NONFUEL EXPENSES includes payroll costs (not separately identified), both this and 
EMPLOYEES will reflect changes in staffing.28  The third input is fuel use by type of fuel (tons of 
coal, barrels of oil, and mcf of natural gas).  We convert fuel into BTUs using the reported annual 
plant-specific Btu content of each fuel to obtain total BTU input at the plant for each year.   
 
Input prices pose a challenge.   Wages in particular may be endogenous to the firm and its 
perceived regulatory environment.   Hendricks (1975) suggests that utilities may bargain less 
                                                 
26 The inputs required to produce a given level of energy (MWh) from a specific plant also will depend on 
whether the plant runs continuously or intermittently and on its average capacity utilization.  Starting a 
plant frequently and running it at low capacity utilization rates typically use more inputs (particularly fuel) 
per mwh generated than does running a plant continuously at its rated capacity. 
27 For instance, under traditional regulation, utilities may have faced strong political incentives to avoid 
blackouts or brownouts, leading to investment in greater capacity to increase reserve margins and in greater 
maintenance resources to increase plant reliability.  On the other hand, competitive firms producing in 
restructured wholesale markets may face even stronger incentives to be available when demand peaks 
because this is when prices are highest.   
28 The elasticity of NONFUEL EXPENSES with respect to EMPLOYEES is about .5 in our data, broadly 
consistent with our back of the envelope calculations suggesting that labor costs are roughly half of the 
total nonfuel operating budget. 
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aggressively over input prices such as wages during periods in which higher costs could be 
readily passed on to customers through higher regulated prices, and more aggressively when the 
firm was likely to be the residual claimant to cost savings.  In other industries, regulatory reform 
has sometimes been associated with substantial reductions in wages, suggesting rent-sharing 
under regulation (see Rose, 1987, on the trucking industry).   These suggest that observed wages 
may not be exogenous to the firm, and may not reflect the opportunity cost to managers of the 
marginal unit of labor.  We address this by using state-level average wages from industries with 
workers of similar skills and training to power plant operators, including natural gas distribution, 
petroleum refining and hazardous waste treatment facilities, denoted as WAGE.  This reflects 
opportunity wages, and avoids confounding the employee price measurement with any changes in 
recorded wages due to changes in labor force composition at utilities associated with restructuring 
or changes in wage bargaining.  We do not have plant- or even firm-specific indices for the 
materials prices that comprise NONFUEL EXPENSES.  Our empirical model of NONFUEL 
EXPENSES therefore corresponds to an input demand equation with constant prices and a price 
coefficient of one.    
 
The final input is the capital stock of the plant, which we measure by plant capacity and vintage.  
Our data record the plant capacity in megawatts.  We combine this with information on unit 
retirements to define plant-epochs.  Each plant is assigned a unique identifier.  Any time the 
capacity of the plant is significantly changed, or there is an identifiable unit addition or unit 
retirement, we create a new identifier and associated new plant-specific effect.  This allows 
capital changes to alter the underlying input efficiency of the plant.   
 
We include controls for two other plant characteristics that may vary within plant-epoch and lead 
to changes in input use.  The first is plant AGE in years, dated from the installation date of the 
oldest operating generating unit at the plant:  as plants age they may become less efficient or 
require additional inputs for a given level of output.  The second is the addition of a flue-gas 
desulfurization system, or FGD (also called scrubber), to reduce sulfur-dioxide emissions in some 
coal plants.  FGD affects the environmental output, unmeasured by ln(NET MWhs). 
 
We supplement the operational plant data with information on state-level restructuring activity.  
For each state, we have identified the date at which formal hearings on restructuring began, the 
enactment date for legislation restructuring the state’s utility sector, if any, the implementation 
date for retail access under that legislation, and some associated aspects of restructuring such as 
rate freezes and mandatory divestiture of generation.  Testing for restructuring-specific shocks 
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requires a determination of how to match this information with firm decisions:  when were plant 
operators in a given state likely to have begun responding to a policy change?  Consultations with 
industry participants and readings of these events suggest that utilities often acted in advance of 
final outcomes.  The legislative and regulatory process leading up to state restructuring typically 
lasted a number of years, allowing utilities to anticipate the coming change, and alter their 
behavior in advance.  For example, Boston Edison’s 10-K filed in March 1994 discussed 
Massachusetts’ consideration of restructuring, stating  “The Company is responding to the current 
and anticipated competitive pressure with a commitment to cost control and increased operating 
efficiency without sacrificing quality of service or profitability” (p. 6).29  Utilities may have 
begun to phase in input changes, especially those involving labor and particularly unionized 
workers.  Moreover, as policy changes were discussed, rates were frozen in many states, either 
explicitly by policy makers or in effect by implicit PUC decisions not to hear new rate cases, 
enabling utilities to capture the savings from incremental cost reductions.30   
 
In this work, we allow restructuring effects to begin with the opening of formal hearings on 
restructuring.  The primary variable of interest, RESTRUCTURED, is an indicator variable that 
turns on with the start of formal proceedings in a state that eventually passed restructuring 
legislation.31  A second variable, RETAIL ACCESS, indicates the start of retail access for plants in 
the four states that implemented retail competition during the sample.32  Table 1 reports the 
number of plants in our database each year that were in states that had RESTRUCTURED and the 
                                                 
29 In a 1993 article outlining PECO’s cost saving accomplishments and strategies for the future, Chairman 
and CEO Joseph Paquette discussed restructuring of the utility industry and was quoted as stating, “we 
have been focusing on our strategic plans to enhance our abilities to satisfy our customer needs by 
becoming more competitive.” PECO initiatives cited in the article included improving the cost 
effectiveness of all operations.  One particular accomplishment noted was the reduction in total 
employment from 18,700 to 12,900. 
30 As noted earlier, some of these changes may have also affected utilities in non-restructuring states.  For 
example, the number of utility rate cases dropped dramatically in the 1990s, implying that many or most 
utilities may have been short- or medium-run residual claimants to cost reductions.  Knittel (2002) 
identifies a number of incentive regulations adopted in various jurisdictions during the 1990s.  Many of the 
fuel-related regulations (modified pass-through clauses, heat rate and equivalent availability factor 
incentive programs) were strongly correlated with ultimate restructuring.  Some of the broader regulations 
(e.g., price caps and revenue decoupling programs) were almost orthogonal to eventual restructuring. 
31 The RESTRUCTURED variable is based on whether a state had passed legislation as of mid-2001, 
although in the aftermath of the California electricity crisis, there has been no additional restructuring, and 
some delays or suspension of planned restructuring activity. 
32 While RESTRUCTURED indicates approval of retail access legislation, the specified phase-in of retail 
access was often slow.  Only five states implemented retail access during our sample period:  Rhode Island 
in 1997, California, Massachusetts, and New York in 1998, and Pennsylvania in 1999 (U.S. EIA, 2003).  
Because we have no valid observations on Rhode Island plants in 1997 or beyond, retail access effects will 
be determined by the 4 states implementing in 1998 or 1999.  Divestiture requirements in California and 
Massachusetts further reduces the post-retail access sample of plants, as investor-owned plants in those 
states were largely divested by 1999. 
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number of plants in states that had started retail access by 1999.33  If utilities did not respond until 
restructuring legislation or regulation was enacted and the policy uncertainty resolved, 
RESTRUCTURED will underestimate the true effect by averaging in non-response years.  To 
evaluate this possibility we introduce a third variable, LAW PASSED, an indicator equal to one 
beginning in the year the state passes restructuring legislation.34  Similarly if actual 
implementation of retail access and the associated wholesale market reforms is important to 
efficiency gains, it will be reflected in an incremental effect of RETAIL ACCESS.  To examine 
municipally-owned plants over the restructuring time period, we define the variable MUNI*POST 
1992, equal to one for all municipally-owned plants from 1993, the first year for which 
RESTRUCTURED is one, through 1999.  The final column reports the number of plants in this 
category. 
 
Details on the data sources and summary statistics are provided in the appendix.  Tables 2a and 
2b report summary statistics for plant-level data in 1985 across three categories:  investor-owned 
plants in states that later restructure, investor-owned plants in states that do not restructure, and 
non-IOU plants.  We choose this date to ensure that comparisons are made prior to any significant 
changes across states in the competitive or regulatory environment, even prior to restructuring 
initiatives.  From these tables, it appears that the plants from these groups are not random draws 
from the same population.  The first three variables measure employees and non-fuel operating 
expenses, scaled by the plant’s capacity, and fuel use in millions of British thermal units 
(mmBtus), scaled by the plant’s output.  In 1985, before state-level restructuring initiatives were 
considered, plants in states that eventually restructured had higher intensities of employees and 
non-fuel operating expenses, although the difference is significant only for non-fuel expenses.  
The first two rows in Table 2b show that municipally-owned plants had significantly higher 
employment and non-fuel input use than plants in non-restructuring states.  The differences in 
heat rates and capacity factors are not significant in either of the tables.  The last four variables in 
both tables describe the stock of plants in the two types of states.  Although plants are very 
similar in size across IOUs, MUNIs plants are considerably smaller.  IOU plants in restructuring 
                                                 
33 For the tables and the regression analysis that follows, plants are assigned to the state in which they are 
regulated.  A plant located in one state may be owned by a company with exclusive service territory in a 
different state, and that second state is the state by which the regulatory policy is measured.  Some plants 
are owned by a company with service territory in more than one state and some plants are owned by 
several companies that are regulated by different states. In the regression analysis, we found that separately 
characterizing “mixed” regulation and “shared” plants had very little impact on our results. 
34 There is on average about a 2.6-year lag between the initiation of hearings and the passage of the law.  
We have experimented with a number of alternative measures of restructuring activity, including variables 
that begin with hearings regardless of restructuring outcomes, those that measure years since hearings were 
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states tended to be older, more likely to use gas, and less likely to use coal, than IOU plants in 
non-restructuring states.  MUNI plants tended to be younger, less likely to use coal, and more 
likely to use gas, than IOU plants in non-restructuring states.  The regression analysis will control 
for these differences directly or with the use of plant-epoch effects.    
 
If investor-owned utilities achieved efficiency improvements when facing impending 
restructuring of the generation sector, one would expect to see a relative decrease in the cost of 
generation for affected companies, and little difference in the change in transmission and 
distribution costs between the affected and not affected states since restructuring programs leave 
transmission and distribution comparatively untouched.  If restructuring did not affect operating 
efficiency in the generation sector, we might expect either (1) the change in generation expenses 
would not be statistically different between restructuring and non-restructuring companies, or (2) 
we would see the same pattern of change in costs for the transmission and distribution sectors as 
for the generation sector.35  
 
Table 3a and 3b display the difference in mean tests for investor-owned utilities in restructuring 
and non-restructuring states for a change in costs between 1990 and 1996. Table 3a reports the 
percentage change in total costs for each category of cost, and Table 3b reports the percentage 
change in costs per MWh.  The larger decrease in generation costs at restructuring companies is 
significant at the 1% level, and the result for generation costs per MWh is significant at the 6% 
level.  The difference in costs for companies in restructuring and non-restructuring states is not 
significant for either the transmission or distribution costs.  These aggregate statistics provide 
preliminary support for the expectation that the portion of the utility company faced with 
competition (the generating sector) responded with a decrease in costs, while other sectors and 
companies not faced with competition did not share this response. 
 
4. The Effects of Restructuring on Input Use 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
initiated for states that eventually restructured, and the presence of restructuring-associated rate freezes.  
None of these seem to change materially to the conclusions we draw below. 
35 For the analysis comparing costs of generation, transmission, and distribution services, we rely on data 
reported annually by utility companies to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the FERC 
Form 1, page 320, 321, and 322 respectively.  We use a balanced sample composed of all companies with 
data reported for all three sectors in both 1990 and 1996.  This amounts to 49 companies in states that did 
not deregulate and 74 in states that did deregulate for the comparison of costs, and 48 and 72 respectively 
for the comparison of costs per MWh. Using costs per MWh necessitates the exclusion of a few companies 
for which MWh data was not available in one of the two years.  
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Following equation (I1), we estimate the influence of restructuring on the use of input N 
(EMPLOYEES, NONFUEL EXPENSE, and BTUs) with the following basic regression model: 
  
(R1) ln(Nirt) = β1Nln(NET MWhirt) + β2Nln(PRICENrt ) + β3kAGEirt + β4kFGDirt + 
 φ r NIOU*RESTRUCTURED  + γMUNI1993-1999 +  αiN + δtN  + β1Nε irt A + ε ir tN 
 
where we allow for non-unity coefficients on the output term (β1N ) for all equations and on the 
input price term (β2N on WAGE) in the EMPLOYEES  equation,36  and include controls for two 
important plant characteristics that vary over time:  AGE and FGD (scrubber).  αiN is a time-
invariant fixed effect for input N at plant-epoch i, which may contain a state-specific and 
ownership-specific error that will not be separately identified.  These plant-specific effects 
control for much of the expected variation in input use across plants arising from heterogeneous 
technologies, state or regional fixed factors, and basic efficiency differences.  They also control 
for differences in the plant mix between restructuring and non-restructuring states by comparing 
each plant to itself over time, removing any time-invariant plant effects.  As a Hausman test 
rejects the exogeneity of plant effects, all reported results include plant-epoch fixed-effects.37   δtN 
is an industry-level effect in year t, which controls for systematic changes in input demand across 
all plants over time.    
 
εirtN is assumed to be a time varying mean zero shock for input N at plant-epoch i in regime r at 
time t.  This shock is unlikely to be independent over time for a given plant.  There is likely to be 
persistence in input shocks, particularly for labor, from year to year.  Indeed, estimated rhos 
based on assumed first-order serial correlation are in the .65 range for labor inputs and in the .33 
range for non-fuel expenses.   It is unlikely that the correlation is as simple as a first-order 
autogressive process, however.   The physical operation of power plants is likely to induce some 
correlation at longer differences.  For example, routine maintenance cycles may involve 
scheduled shutdowns but increased labor and nonfuel expenses every three or four years.  We 
have explored GLS specifications based on an assumption of first-order autoregressive errors, and 
the results are quite similar to those reported in the tables below.  Rather than impose this 
assumption, however, we choose to estimate the model without a GLS correction, and simply 
                                                 
36 Recall that we do not have a price associated with nonfuel expenses, and that according to equation (E1), 
fuel prices should not enter into the fuel input function.  We experimented with using a variable measuring 
the price of a given plant’s fuel relative to the prices of other fuels in the same region as an instrument for 
output but the variable had no power in the first stage. 
37 This use of fixed effects is similar to the work of Joskow and Schmalensee (1987), who used generating 
unit-level data to explore the relationship between operating performance and unit characteristics.  Our 
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report standard errors that are corrected for a general pattern of correlation over time within a 
given plant.38
Input use over time will vary with the level of plant operation, which is measured in these 
specifications as the net generation by the plant in megawatt-hours (NET MWh).  We treat the 
endogeneity and measurement problems described earlier by instrumenting for output with state 
demand (the log of total state electricity sales, a consumption rather than production measure). 
This instrument affects the likelihood that a given plant in the state will be dispatched more over 
the year, but is not influenced by the characteristics of the plant or the choices of individual plant 
operators. 
 
We consider specifications that include interactions of IOU ownership with the three primary 
restructuring indicator variables described in section 3:  RESTRUCTURED, LAW PASSED, and 
RETAIL ACCESS.   In the input regressions, a negative coefficient on the restructuring variables 
would imply increased input efficiency associated with the regulatory reform.  The core results 
for the input analysis are presented in Tables 4 for EMPLOYEES, 5 for NONFUEL EXPENSES 
and 6 for BTU.  We first discuss the results for employment and nonfuel expenses, and then 
discuss the results for fuel use. 
 
Column 1 of  tables 4 and 5 reports a simple OLS formulation that excludes any control for 
output.  In this column, IOU*RESTRUCTURED captures the mean differential in input use for 
investor-owned plants in states that eventually pass restructuring legislation, measured over the 
period following the first restructuring hearings, relative to IOU plants in non-restructuring states.  
This corresponds to the mean within-plant shift in input use, independent of output.  The results 
suggest statistically and economically significant declines in inputs during restructuring.  
Employment declines by almost 6% (2%) and nonfuel expenses decline by almost 13% (2%),39 
relative to IOU plants in regimes that have not restructured.  Controlling for plant output reduces 
the estimated impact of restructuring by more than one-quarter, though the effects remain large 
and statistically distinguishable from zero (see column 2 of each table), at -4% (2%) for 
employment and -10% (2%) for nonfuel expenses.40  Measuring restructuring effects from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
fixed effects are actually finer than plant-level, as we permit αi to change with unit additions or retirements 
and other significant changes in rated plant capacity. 
38 Reported standard errors are calculated using the cluster option in Stata. 
39 We use  [exp(φ r N )-1]*100 to approximate the implied percentage effect of  IOU* RESTRUCTURED on 
input use. 
40 Note that the Cobb-Douglas functional form assumption suggests that the coefficient on output should be 
one, substantially larger than the coefficients estimated in these regressions.  If we impose this constraint, 
the effect of restructuring is estimated to be positive and significant.   We have estimated production 
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enactment date of legislation does little to change the qualitative conclusions (see column 3 in 
each table.).   
 
This finding hints at an interesting pattern in the data:  restructuring is associated with same-plant 
output reductions relative to same-plant output in non-restructured regimes at the same date.  This 
is why estimated input use reductions associated with restructuring are smaller in the presence of 
output controls.  Some of this might be expected:  if these plants were less efficient prior to 
restructuring, as the raw input and price data suggest may have been the case, they may be used 
less in a more competitive environment.  If restructuring encourages entry by non-utility or 
exempt generators, this might further reduce output at less efficient plants.41  Some plant-level 
output reduction also may be generated by the apparent lower growth in state-level electricity 
consumption in restructuring states, relative to electricity consumption growth in non-
restructuring states.42  
 
This result is not only of interest economically, but also is important for the econometric 
estimation of the input demand relationship.  The inverse correlation of output and restructuring 
policy attaches great importance to obtaining a consistent estimate of the relationship between 
output and input demand.  Understating the response of input use to output changes will load 
more of observed input reductions onto the restructuring variable, overstating the responsiveness 
will lead to underestimates of the restructuring effect. 
 
The second notable pattern is the dependence of the implied restructuring effect on the control 
group.   While IOU plants in restructuring states exhibit modest reductions in employment and 
nonfuel expenses relative to IOUs in non-restructuring states, the implied reductions are more 
than twice as large when compared to public and cooperative plants over the restructuring period.  
Employment drops by 13-15 percent (see the difference in the IOU*RESTRUCTURED and 
MUNI*POST 1992 coefficients in columns 2 and 3 in table 4) and nonfuel expenses decline by 
21-23 percent (columns 2 and 3 in table 5), relative to municipal plants over the 1993-1999 
                                                                                                                                                 
functions in EMPLOYEES and NON-FUEL EXPENSES using more flexible functional forms than Cobb-
Douglas, and the results also suggest efficiency gains associated with restructuring.  We have also 
estimated instrumental variables versions of equations (L2) and (M2) that include the other input instead of 
output and obtained very similar results to those reported here.  
41Total state-level electricity consumption, while increasing on average during the 1993-1999 period in 
restructuring states, appears to grow less fast than consumption in non-restructuring states. 
42 This is unlikely to be causally related to restructuring, as restructuring effects on retail rates were neutral 
or negative (due to rate freezes) during this period.   There is, however, a negative correlation between 
state electricity consumption and restructuring, conditioning on state means and national growth rates in 
electricity consumption. 
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period.  This suggests that even IOU plants in non-restructuring regimes were reducing their input 
use to a significant extent during the 1993-1999 period, perhaps in response to latent threats of 
increased competition and restructuring.  We return to this issue in greater detail below.   
 
Given the importance of controlling for output in assessing restructuring effects, we next turn to 
instrumental variables estimates of the input equations that treat potential measurement error and 
simultaneity bias with respect to output.  Column 4 of these tables instrument for the log of 
current plant output with the log of total electricity sales in the state.43  This has opposite effects 
on the estimated output coefficients for the two input demands.  For EMPLOYEES, the 
instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the output coefficient are below the OLS estimates, 
although the imprecision of the IV estimates make it difficult to reject equivalence.  This is 
consistent with there being a positive relationship between shocks to efficiency and input use, 
although as we discuss below, the direction of this relationship is not robust to alternative 
specifications of the instrument.  Both OLS and IV estimates of the labor demand elasticity with 
respect to output are quite small (at 8.1% (1% standard error) and 6.5% (7.5%), respectively for 
the basic specification), suggesting that labor is relatively fixed.   Consistent with this, the 
estimated coefficient on IOU*RESTRUCTURED is largely unchanged in the basic specification, 
at -4.5% (2.3%).     
 
In the case of nonfuel expenses, instrumenting for output substantially increases the estimated 
output elasticity, from 15% (1%) to 40% (9%) in the basic specification.  This is consistent with 
negative correlations of input shocks and output, as for example, if large maintenance 
expenditures are associated with outages at the plant.  Given the strong link between output and 
nonfuel expenses implied by these results, and the fact that both declined with restructuring, 
instrumenting also has a substantial effect on the estimated effect of restructuring.  The estimated 
coefficient on  IOU*RESTRUCTURED coefficient drops by more than half, bringing it into the 
range of the estimated labor input effect at about -4.8% (2.8%).    
 
Columns 5 and 6 of the tables explore robustness to alternative measures of restructuring, 
maintaining the use of IV estimates. 44   Measuring restructuring by LAW PASSED  in column 5 
                                                 
43 This is an important determinant of plant-level output.  The F-statistic from the test that ln(STATE 
SALES) is zero in the first stage for Column (4) is F(1,9674)=18.13 for Table 4 and F(1,9686)=16.68 for 
Table 5). 
44 Results are broadly similar in unreported regressions that measure restructuring from the date of 
legislation, although the effect of RETAIL ACCESS is further tempered, and in regressions that add the 
number of years since hearings were begun, which suggest that employment and nonfuel expense 
reductions begin relatively small and increase over time. 
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yields slightly larger coefficients on restructuring in the employment regressions and slightly 
smaller (and statistically indistinguishable from zero) coefficients in the nonfuel expense 
regressions.  Column 6 adds the RETAIL ACCESS variable.  We note that its coefficient is 
identified by no more than two years of data in the four states that implement retail access as of 
1999, and it is not particularly stable across alternative instrument sets.  The coefficient on 
RETAIL ACCESS in labor demand is imprecisely estimated, though the point estimate suggests an 
additional –5% (5% standard error) change in employment when states implement retail access.  
The estimated impact of retail access on nonfuel expenses is substantially larger, at -15% 
(7.8%).   
 
In the instrumental variables results, as in the OLS results, the implied magnitude of the 
restructuring effect depends upon the chosen benchmark or control group.  The gap in IOU input 
demand between restructuring and non-restructuring states, conditional on output, is generally 
statistically and economically significant, though relatively modest.  The performance gain of an 
IOU plant in a restructured regime relative to MUNI plants over the same period is substantially 
larger, on the order of 15% reductions in employees and 20% reductions in nonfuel expenses.  
We therefore experimented with a number of more flexible specifications of the MUNI control 
group.  Column 7 of tables 4 and 5 reports one variant, in which we include separate controls for 
MUNI  plants over the 1993-1999 period and MUNI  plants in restructuring regimes 
(MUNI*RESTRUCTURED).  In neither case can we reject the null that MUNI plant input use is 
independent of restructuring (point estimates for MUNI*RESTRUCTURED are positive for 
employees and negative for nonfuel expenses).  In unreported specifications we have allowed for 
more flexible specifications of the MUNI controls over time and for differential MUNI output 
coefficients.  The pattern of results is consistent with input performance gains for IOU plants in 
restructured regimes relative to nonrestructured IOU plants, and even greater gains when 
measured against MUNI performance. 
 
To provide further insight into the question of benchmark group, we re-estimate the basic model 
of column (4) without the IOU*RESTRUCTURED and MUNI*POST 1992 variables, but 
allowing for separate year effects for each of three categories of plants:  IOU plants in states that 
eventually restructure, IOU plants in states that do not restructure, and MUNI plants.  Figures 1 
(employees) and 2 (nonfuel expenses) plot the estimated year effects for each plant group.  Figure 
1 suggests that MUNIs use more labor than do IOU plants, all else equal, throughout the sample 
period.  The figures suggest greater divergence between MUNI and IOU plants in both input 
measures as the 1990s progress.  As this is a period of increasing competitive pressures and 
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substantial movement toward restructuring, these patterns suggest to us that there is considerable 
information in the MUNI benchmark comparisons. 
 
Table 6 reports results from variants of our basic specification for fuel inputs.  In column 1, the 
output coefficient is constrained to unity (effectively estimating ln(BTU/MWh) as a function of 
the right-hand side variables).  In this specification, IOU plants in restructured regimes appear to 
use slightly more fuel than IOU plants in nonrestructured regimes, all else equal, though the 
effect is imprecisely estimated (1.2%, standard error 0.8%).  Column 2 reports OLS results 
relaxing the output coefficient constraint, which generates a lower estimated output elasticity (.9, 
standard error .1), and an implied reduction in fuel use associated with IOU plants in restructuring 
regimes (-1.2%, again relatively imprecise with a standard error 0.7%).  The remaining columns 
report results instrumenting for output with state electricity consumption.  The qualitative results 
in all four columns are very similar—fuel use is very highly correlated with the megawatt-hours a 
plant produces, with an estimated output elasticity that is slightly below one though statistically 
indistinguishable from unity.  This could reflect slight increasing returns to scale with respect to 
fuel, consistent with the well-understood engineering relation between more efficient fuel burn 
and higher levels of output at a given plant, though the data are not precise enough to establish 
this. 
 
In all IV specifications, the coefficient estimates for IOU*RESTRUCTURED are small, positive, 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  These provide no evidence of restructuring effects 
on fuel efficiency relative to IOU plants in non-restructuring states.  Indeed, the coefficient on 
RETAIL ACCESS in column 5 implies 5% (3%) higher fuel use, all else equal, for plants 
operating under retail access—an enormous increase in economic terms.  While somewhat higher 
fuel use in restructured wholesale markets could be consistent with more startup and ramping 
costs as plants adjust their output to follow hourly changes in marginal revenue, the estimated 
magnitude of this effect is too large to be explained even by this behavior.   
 
The difference between IOU and MUNI plants is more difficult to pin down for fuel use than for 
the other inputs.  The MUNI coefficient point estimates are slightly larger, and though they can be 
distinguished from zero, are not generally distinguishable from the IOU*RESTRUCTURED point 
estimates.  We find little evidence of gains in fuel efficiency over our horizon from restructuring, 
though a caveat is in order.  While variations on the order of even 0.5%-1% in fuel productivity 
are economically significant, it may be difficult to measure these sufficiently precisely with our 
aggregated data.  Because fuel efficiency at a plant is heavily influenced by factors such as the 
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allocation of output across units at a plant, the number of times its units are stopped and started, 
and for how long the units were running below their capacity, our inability to measure or control 
for possible changes in these operational characteristics may make it particularly difficult to 
capture fuel efficiency changes.  We continue to explore this aspect of utility input choice. 
 
Sample selection 
As noted earlier, our results could be affected by sample attrition due to plant retirements and 
ownership transfers that eliminated data reporting.   Plant sales are particularly an issue in retail 
access states, as exempt wholesale generators (EWGs) purchased plants that incumbents were 
required to divest during restructuring.  Since EWGs are not regulated by FERC in the traditional 
sense, these companies are not required to report operating data on their plants, and hence drop 
out of the database.  If the plants dropping out of the sample had been systematically higher or 
lower in efficiency relative to their plant-epoch effect and to surviving plants, selection bias could 
contaminate the restructuring estimates.  One could construct plausible stories that plants selected 
for purchase were very efficient and thus good acquisition targets, or that inefficient plants left 
the database due to retirements or sales that offered the new owners the opportunity for 
substantial gain if efficiency could be improved.  The correlation coefficient of the last year of 
data on the plant with the efficiency measures used in the regression is negative (-0.17 for 
employees per MW, -0.05 for non-fuel expenses per MW), suggesting that less efficient plants 
tend to drop out of the database, either because they are sold or shutdown.  To assess the impact 
of attrition, we estimated both basic IV specifications and specifications that included the RETAIL 
ACCESS variable, in each case restricting the sample to plants that were in the dataset in the last 
year, 1999.  The results for this sample (available from the authors) are for the most part very 
similar to the results for the full sample, suggesting that selection bias is not significant in our 
results.  The one exception is the coefficient on IOU*RETAIL, which declines in magnitude and 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  This may be consistent with anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that utilities deferred maintenance on plants they knew they were going to divest, 
which could be picked up with the coefficient on IOU*RETAIL until we limit the sample, or 
simply due to the difficulty of estimating the RETAIL ACCESS effect with so little data.45
 
Testing robustness of the RESTRUCTURED effect 
                                                 
45 Imposing this selection rule eliminates, for example, almost all Massachusetts and California IOU plants 
due to required divestitures before 1999.   
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We next consider the robustness of our results to a variety of alternative specifications of the 
input demand equations.  Given the null results in our basic fuel use regressions, we focus on 
labor and nonfuel expense input choices in this analysis. 
 
In Table 7, we report results that use an alternative measure of competitive pressure, based on an 
indicator that turns on in 1993 if the plant is in a state that has above median penetration of non-
utility generation as of 1993 (HIGH NUGS).  This measure should capture any utility responses 
to higher intensity of actual generation competition from unregulated market participants.  We 
consider this as a replacement for the policy variables in columns 1 and 3, and as a complement 
to the policy variable in columns 2 and 4, which include direct effects of RESTRUCTURED and 
HIGH NUGS  in addition to an interaction of these variables, BOTH.  The estimated impact of 
high levels of non-utility generation on employment at IOU plants (columns 1) is negative and 
larger than the estimated effect of RESTRUCTURED in table 4, at -6% (3%).   The effect is 
somewhat larger in column 2, which includes controls for restructuring, at -8% (3%), as is the 
estimated direct effect of restructuring (-6%, 3% standard error).   It appears that these 
mechanisms are close substitutes, however, as the presence of BOTH largely offsets the effect of 
RESTRUCTURED (with a positive though insignificant effect estimated at 6%, standard error 
3%).   For nonfuel expenses, high NUG penetration appears to have no detectable direct effect on 
IOU plant input use, and the results in column 4 suggest that controlling for NUG penetration 
eliminates the direct measured restructured effect:  Only IOU plants in regimes with both high 
NUG penetration and restructuring reduce nonfuel expenses relative to other IOU plants (see the 
coefficient on BOTH in column 4).  In all four specifications, the estimated difference between 
MUNIS and IOUS is around 15%, very similar to this difference in tables 4 and 5. 
 
In tables 8 (employees) and 9 (nonfuel expenses), we explore results for two sampling strata:  
large v. small plants (columns 1 and 2), and old v. new plants (columns 3 and 4).  Recall that 
these are dimensions on which municipal plants appear to differ from IOU plants.  For all 
specifications, IOU plants in restructured regimes exhibit lower input use than do IOU plants in 
nonrestructured regimes (see the coefficients on IOU*RESTRUCTURED), though the magnitude 
of the estimated effect varies with the subsample.  Employee reductions appear to be largest at 
small and old plants; nonfuel expense reductions appear to be largest at large plants, and similar 
across old and new plants.  More interesting, perhaps, is the comparison to MUNI plants.  The 
coefficient on MUNI*POST 1992 measures the difference between publicly-owned plants and 
IOUs in nonrestructuring regimes over the 1993-1999 period.    While the point estimates remain 
positive, consistent with MUNI plants using more inputs than IOUs during this time, the relative 
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performance of MUNIs differs across subsamples.  They appear in general less inefficient for old 
plants (see column 3 of both tables), and are indistinguishable from IOUs in employment changes 
at old plants.  Changes in employment at MUNI plants are more in line with IOUs at small plants, 
and for nonfuel expenses, the difference does not appear to vary with the size of the plant.  While 
these differences are of some interest, it does not appear that the conclusions of the earlier tables 
with respect to the MUNI benchmark are substantially affected by these sample plant differences. 
 
In table 10, we consider whether the results are explained by a regression to the mean 
phenomenon among IOU plants:  is the gain in efficiency among plants in restructuring regimes 
because they had on average low productivity draws prior to restructuring, and simply return to 
mean efficiency over time?   To examine this, we identify high and low cost plants and 
investigate the extent to which efficiency gains at the higher cost plants are offset by efficiency 
losses at low cost plants.  To separate plants into “cheap” and “expensive” categories, we predict 
input use from a regression on data for the pre-restructuring period, 1981 – 1992.  We calculate 
the mean residual for each plant and classify plants with mean residuals above zero as 
“expensive” and those below zero as “cheap.”  We then interact these expensive and cheap 
indicators with the restructuring variables, which are post-1992 and re-run the basic regression 
specification using these more detailed restructuring variables.46 The results in columns 1 and 2 
suggest most of the input declines relative to IOU plants in non-restructured regimes are 
associated with expensive IOU plants, at roughly 10% reductions in both labor and nonfuel 
expenses for expensive plants.  The coefficients on the IOU*RESTRUCTURED* CHEAP 
interactions are economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero, contrary to mean 
reversion predictions, and perhaps suggesting that the form of efficiency improvement was to 
bring less efficient plants into line with more efficient plants.  This is consistent with comments 
we have received from several industry participants, who claimed that restructuring led their 
firms to identify high-cost plants as those disadvantaged in the dispatch order, and to focus 
attention on bringing the costs of those plants closer to an efficient benchmark plant.  Using the 
MUNI benchmark implies larger efficiency gains for both cheap and expensive IOU plants, as 
both categories of MUNI plants experienced higher input use than IOU plants in nonrestructured 
states, though the increase was largest at the cheap MUNI plants. 
 
We have implemented a number of additional robustness checks, including alternative 
instruments and instrument strategies and more flexible dynamics in input choice.  A more 
complete discussion and example results are available in a technical appendix. Of particular note 
                                                 
46 The direct effects of cheap and expensive are absorbed in the plant fixed effects. 
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were specifications that allow for the possibility of fixed costs of input adjustments.  We find that 
the restructuring estimates are robust to allowing for differential effects of output on input use 
depending on whether current output is above or below plant mean output, and to allowing inputs 
to respond to future as well as current output levels.   Labor use estimates were less robust to 
using lagged values of output as instruments, following Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000),   
although the estimated difference between IOU plants in restructuring regimes and MUNIs 
remained economically important.47
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research provides some of the first estimates of the impact of electricity generation sector 
restructuring in the United States on plant-level efficiency.  The results suggest restructuring may 
yield substantive medium-run efficiency gains.  The estimates suggests that IOU plants in 
restructuring regimes reduced their labor and nonfuel operating expenses by about 5% in 
anticipation of increased competition in electricity generation relative to IOU plants in states that 
did not restructure their markets.  The estimated efficiency gains are even larger when compared 
to a benchmark based on municipal, federal, and cooperative plants, on the order of 15% 
reductions in labor use and 20% reductions in nonfuel operating expenses relative to non-IOU 
plants over the same time period.   There is little evidence of increases in fuel efficiency relative 
to plants in non-restructuring regimes, although the power of these tests is limited given the 
plausible range of possible fuel use improvements.   
 
These same-plant reductions in input use suggest an important role for competition in promoting 
technical efficiency, buttressing the findings of Nickell (1996), Ng and Seabright (2001), and 
Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002), among others.  This finding is particularly interesting given 
the industry context.  Generating plant technology is reasonably well understood by engineers, 
and the pre-restructuring industry was remarkably open in sharing detailed information on plant 
operations and input use across plants and firms.48  Presumably, external benchmarks were more 
accessible in this setting than in most industries.  This could suggest that competition induced 
greater effort on cost reduction by increasing the sensitivity of returns to managerial and worker 
effort, rather than by reducing informational asymmetries over managerial effort (see Nickell, 
1996). 
 
                                                 
47 Whether lagged output is a valid instrument for this application is, moreover, a debatable proposition.  
48 Evidenced, for example, by our use of publicly available, plant-identifiable, data in our analysis. 
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Additional work remains to be done to fill out the picture of the overall effects of restructuring on 
electricity industry efficiency.49  We have started by looking at operating efficiency within 
existing utility plants both because this is one of the few places where gains are likely to show up 
before restructured wholesale markets open up and because rich data are available on utility-
owned plants.  As our results suggest, even these data are inadequate for the fine-level analysis 
required to estimate within and across-plant changes in fuel efficiency.  This analysis will require 
datasets with both cleaner measures of fuel efficiency and richer information on independent 
factors that affect fuel use.  Finally, assessing whether investment decisions are made more 
efficiently after restructuring requires more time, and access to better non-utility data.  Since 
power plants are so long-lived, very few new additions are made each year, and currently we have 
no more than a handful of anecdotes about investment after restructuring.   
 
It is important to recognize that these efficiency estimates are, however, only one input to judging 
the ultimate benefit of restructuring policies.  The overall assessment depends as well on the 
realized magnitude of potential dynamic efficiencies, and possible offsetting effects from higher 
investment expenditures, restructuring costs, the loss of coordination and network economies 
within vertically integrated systems, and the exercise of market power in unregulated generation 
markets.  Dynamic costs could be higher if restructuring reduces knowledge sharing that affects 
productivity growth over time.  It is possible, however, that longer run effects will be more 
striking as firms respond to the new incentives created by restructuring with investments in both 
human and physical capital that further enhance efficiency.  If California’s crisis does not induce 
reversals of the restructuring movement, and regulators do not shut down data reporting and 
researcher access to detailed plant-level data, time may enable us to distinguish among these 
possibilities. 
                                                 
49 See Wolfram (2004) for a discussion of the general issues involved in assessing different types of 
efficiency changes accompany electricity restructuring. 
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Table 1: Number of Plants Affected by Restructuring in Each Year 
 
 
Year 
Total 
Plants 
IOU* 
RESTRUCTURED 
IOU*RETAIL 
ACCESS 
MUNI* 
POST 1992 
1981 465 0 0 0 
1982 490 0 0 0 
1983 511 0 0 0 
1984 527 0 0 0 
1985 546 0 0 0 
1986 547 0 0 0 
1987 582 0 0 0 
1988 588 0 0 0 
1989 592 0 0 0 
1990 597 0 0 0 
1991 600 0 0 0 
1992 591 0 0 0 
1993 602 27 0 119 
1994 598 103 0 129 
1995 608 166 0 129 
1996 589 187 0 119 
1997 569 239 0 101 
1998 557 236 47 101 
1999 486 183 30 91 
TOTAL 10645 1,141 77 789 
 
Note: RESTRUCTURED indicated those that have started formal hearings that 
eventually go on to pass legislation, and RETAIL ACCESS indicates plants in 
states that have started retail access. 
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 Table 2a: Summary of Data for Plants Larger Than 100 MW, 1985: Restructured versus 
Non-Restructured IOUs 
RESTRUCTURED 
(N = 244) 
NON-RESTRUCTURED 
(N = 196) 
Variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
Difference 
in Means 
T-statistic 
for 
Difference  
EMPLOYEES / MW 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.14 .03 1.79 
NONFUEL EXPENSE/ MW 19780 14354 16490  8496 3291 2.99** 
HEAT RATE 11 2.0 11 3.1 -.1 -.54 
CAPACITY FACTOR 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.20 -.01 -.54 
MW 806 662 806 645 .8 0.01 
AGE 28 11 24 13 3.4 2.95** 
% COAL 52 50 80 40 -28 -6.48** 
% GAS 36 48 16 37 21  5.11** 
 
Table 2b: Summary of Data for Plants Larger Than 100 MW, 1985: Munis versus  
Non-Restructured IOUs 
MUNIS 
(N=106) 
NON-RESTRUCTURED 
(N = 196) 
Variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
Difference 
in Means 
T-statistic 
for 
Difference  
EMPLOYEES / MW 0.27 0.13 0.26 0.14 .01  .45 
NONFUEL EXPENSE/ MW 15220  9292 16490  8496 -1269 -1.17 
HEAT RATE 12 5.9 11 3.1 .4  .68 
CAPACITY FACTOR 0.40 0.23 0.41 0.20 -.01  -.23 
MW 703 608 806 645 -102 -1.36 
AGE 19 11 24 -5  -4.8 -3.53** 
% COAL 68 47 80 40 -12 -2.16** 
% GAS 27 45 16 37  12  2.27** 
** Significant at .05 level or better 
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Table 3a: Percentage Change in Costs From 1990 to 1996 
Difference of Means Tests 
IOUs in Non-Restructuring Versus Restructuring States 
 N Distribution Transmission Generation 
Restructuring  
Mean 
74 12.3% 22.7% -17.0% 
Non- 
Restructuring 
Mean 
49 17.3% 33.8% 4.2% 
Difference  -5.0% -11.1% -21.3% 
t stat  -0.99 -1.34 -3.65** 
*significant at 5% level **significant at 1% level 
All measures are in nominal dollars. 
 
Table 3b: Percentage Change in Costs Per MWh# From 1990 to 1996 
Difference of Means Tests 
IOUs in Non-Restructuring Versus Restructuring States 
 N Distribution Transmission Generation 
Restructuring 
Mean 
72 1.5% 13.1% -13.5% 
Non- 
Restructuring 
Mean 
48 -1.6% 12.6% -5.1% 
Difference  3.1% 0.4% -8.3% 
t stat  0.70 0.06 -1.87 
*significant at 5% level **significant at 1% level 
All measures are in nominal dollars. 
 
# Transmission and Distribution costs per MWh are costs per MWh sales to ultimate 
customers, while Generation costs per MWh are costs per MWhs generated at company 
plants. 
 
Note: Three observations dropped due to lack of MWh data. 
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Table 4:  Base Specifications, ln(EMPLOYEES)          
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  OLS
 
No MWh 
OLS 
 
Basic 
OLS 
 
Law Date 
IV 
 
Basic 
IV 
 
Law Date 
IV  
Retail 
Access 
IV 
Muni* 
Restructured 
-0.059*** -0.042**  -0.045**  -0.050**  -0.047**IOU*RESTRUCTURED 
(0.019)       (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
       -0.059*** -0.066***IOU*LAW PASSED 
       (0.020) (0.024)
       -0.051IOU*RETAIL ACCESS 
       (0.051)
0.091***       0.095*** 0.103*** 0.095*** 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.087***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.026)       (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
       0.034MUNI*RESTRUCTURED 
       (0.045)
-0.119***       -0.098** -0.104*** -0.102** -0.114** -0.112** -0.107**ln(WAGE) 
(0.041)       (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
 0.081***      0.081*** 0.065 0.047 0.041 0.054ln(NET MWH) 
       (0.010) (0.010) (0.075) (0.073) (0.081) (0.079)
0.003       0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002AGE 
(0.002)       (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.065       0.081* 0.085 0.081 0.079 0.073 0.074FGD 
(0.053)       (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051)
N = 10634;  956 Plant-epoch and 19 year effects included.   
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Instrument for ln(NET MWH): ln(STATESALES) 
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Table 5:  Base Specifications, ln(NONFUEL EXPENSES) 
   (1) (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) (7)
  OLS
 
No MWh 
OLS 
 
Basic 
OLS 
 
Law Date 
IV 
 
Basic 
IV 
 
Law Date 
IV  
Retail 
Access 
IV 
Muni* 
Restructured 
-0.135*** -0.103***  -0.048*  -0.046* -0.049* IOU*RESTRUCTURED 
(0.022)       (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
       -0.099*** -0.038IOU*LAW PASSED 
       (0.025) (0.031)
     167**  -0.IOU*RETAIL ACCESS 
       (0.075)
0.131***       0.138*** 0.164*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 0.147*** 0.155***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.028)       (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
       -0.030MUNI*RESTRUCTURED 
       (0.048)
       0.146*** 0.148*** 0.399*** 0.417*** 0.382*** 0.396***ln(NET MWH) 
       (0.013) (0.013) (0.090) (0.088) (0.094) (0.092)
-0.001       -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002AGE 
(0.002)       (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
0.171***       0.201*** 0.209*** 0.253*** 0.260*** 0.250*** 0.252***FGD 
(0.032)       (0.032) (0.030) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
N = 10645;  956 Plant-epoch and 19 year effects included.   
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Instrument for ln(NET MWH): ln(STATESALES)  
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Table 6:  Base Specification, ln(BTU) 
  (1) (2)     (3) (4) (5) (6)
 OLS 
Βln(NET MWH)=1
OLS  IV
Basic 
IV 
Law Date 
IV  
Retail 
Access 
IV 
Muni* 
Restructured 
0.012     -0.013* 0.005 0.005 0.008 IOU*RESTRUCTURED 
(0.008)      (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
     0.008 IOU*LAW PASSED 
      (0.011)
      0.053*IOU*RETAIL ACCESS 
      (0.029)
0.032*      0.027* 0.031* 0.030* 0.031* 0.015MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.017)      (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
      0.082*MUNI*RESTRUCTURED 
      (0.048)
    0.888*** 0.971*** 0.971*** 0.976*** 0.979***ln(NET MWH) 
    (0.010) (0.042) (0.037) (0.045) (0.041)
0.002      0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002AGE 
(0.002)      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.011*      -0.012 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007FGD 
(0.007)      (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
 
N = 10645;  956 Plant-epoch and 19 year effects included.  Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Instrument for ln(NET MWh): ln(STATESALES)  
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Table 7: Non-Utility Generators (NUG) Results, IV Estimates 
 
 (1)    (2) (3) (4)
 IV 
ln(EMPLOYEES) 
IV 
ln(EMPLOYEES) 
IV 
ln(NON-FUEL 
EXPENSES) 
IV 
ln(NON-FUEL 
EXPENSES) 
IOU*HIGH NUGS -0.064**    -0.081*** -0.015 0.037
 (0.027)    (0.027) (0.035) (0.036)
IOU*RESTRUCTURED     -0.065** -0.004
     (0.028) (0.037)
IOU*BOTH     0.054 -0.063
     (0.034) (0.044)
MUNI*POST 1992 0.087***    0.072*** 0.156*** 0.157***
 (0.025)    (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
ln(WAGE) -0.085**    -0.095**
 (0.043)    (0.044)
ln(NET MWH) 0.053    0.012 0.438*** 0.503***
 (0.076)    (0.086) (0.092) (0.103)
AGE 0.003    0.003 -0.002 -0.002
 (0.002)    (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
FGD 0.079**    0.068 0.258*** 0.274***
 (0.039)    (0.052) (0.057) (0.056)
N 10634    10634 10645 10645
 
956 Plant-epoch and 19 year effects included.   
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Instruments for ln(NET MWh): ln(STATESALES)  
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Table 8:  Results by Plant Characteristic, ln(EMPLOYEES) 
 
 IV  IV
  
BIG 
 
SMALL 
 
OLD 
 
NEW 
-0.030    -0.076** -0.061* -0.032IOU*RESTRUCTURED 
(0.026)    (0.036) (0.036) (0.032)
0.062*    0.106*** 0.021 0.111***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.036)    (0.033) (0.040) (0.030)
-0.030    -0.194*** -0.148* -0.097*ln(WAGE) 
(0.057)    (0.068) (0.077) (0.050)
0.028    0.044 0.150 -0.042ln(NET MWH ) 
(0.116)    (0.093) (0.138) (0.101)
<0.001    0.003 0.001 -0.103*AGE 
(0.003)    (0.003) (0.004) (0.054)
0.151***    -0.005 0.061 0.153***FGD 
(0.038)    (0.035) (0.074) (0.026)
Observations 5325    5309 5061 5573
Plant-epoch and year fixed effects included. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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Table 9:  Results by Plant Characteristic, ln(NONFUEL EXPENSES) 
 
 IV  IV
  
BIG 
 
SMALL 
 
OLD 
 
NEW 
-0.074**    -0.044 -0.047 -0.053IOU*RESTRUCTURED 
(0.033)    (0.038) (0.044) (0.035)
0.096**    0.180*** 0.117*** 0.159***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.038)    (0.036) (0.041) (0.034)
0.462***    0.315*** 0.448*** 0.355***ln(NET MWH ) 
(0.164)    (0.084) (0.162) (0.108)
-0.011***    <0.001 -0.008 0.016AGE 
(0.004)    (0.005) (0.006) (0.042)
0.253***    0.256*** 0.301*** 0.085**FGD 
(0.059)    (0.034) (0.071) (0.034)
Observations 5327    5318 5063 5582
Plant-epoch and year fixed effects included. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10:  Test for Mean Reversion Effect, IV Estimates  
 
 ln(EMPLOYEES) ln(NON-FUEL 
EXPENSES) 
IOU*RESTRUCTURED_cheap -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
IOU*RESTRUCTURED_expen -0.106*** -0.102*** 
 (0.031) (0.022) 
MUNI*POST 1992_cheap 0.143*** 0.193*** 
 (0.041) (0.022) 
MUNI*POST 1992_expen 0.056** 0.095*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) 
ln(WAGE) -0.115***  
 (0.045)  
ln(NET MWH) 0.037 0.409*** 
 (0.084) (0.061) 
AGE 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
FGD 0.028 0.235* 
 (0.056) (0.123) 
 10222 10258 
842 plant-epoch and 19 year fixed effects included. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Instruments for MWh: ln(STATESALES) 
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Figure 1: Year-Effects by Group from Basic IV Specification: 
Employment 
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Figure 2: Year-Effects by Group from Basic IV Specification:  
Non-fuel Expenses 
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 Data Appendix – Table A1: Summary of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Output and Input Variables  
LN_NONFUEL EXPENSE Log of the annual non fuel 
production expenses ($)  
UDI 
LN_EMPLOYEES Log of the average number of 
employees at the plant. 
UDI 
LN_BTU Log of the total btus of fuel 
burned by the plant. Calculated 
as (tons of coal * 2000 lbs/ton* 
btu/lb) + (barrels of oil*42 
gal/barrell*btu/gal) + (Mcf 
gas*1000 cf /mcf*btu/cf). The 
values of the btu content of each 
fuel are provided in the UDI data 
for each plant each year. 
UDI 
LN_NET MWH Log of the net MWh generation 
of the plant. 
UDI 
Restructuring Variables  
IOU Dummy equal to 1 for plants 
classified as IOU, holding, or 
private companies. 
1997 UDI Utility 
Datapak Book 
MUNI Dummy equal to 1 for plants 
owned by utilities classified as 
government or cooperative 
utilities. 
1997 UDI Utility 
Datapak Book 
IOU*RESTRUCTURED Dummy equal to one for IOU 
plants in states that restructured 
in years following the advent of 
formal hearings. 
MUNI*RESTRUCTURED Dummy equal to one for MUNI 
plants in states that restructured 
in years following the advent of 
formal hearings 
IOU*LAW PASSED Dummy equal to one for IOU 
plants in states that restructured, 
beginning with year that 
legislation was enacted 
IOU*RETAIL ACCESS Dummy equal to one for IOU 
plants in states that restructured 
in years following the advent of 
retail access.  
Restructuring 
information compiled 
from: EIA "Status of 
State Electric Industry 
Restructuring 
Activity" Timeline as 
of July 2002, EIA 
"The Changing 
Structure of the 
Electric Power 
Industry: An Update, 
12/96," EEI "Electric 
Competition in the 
States" February, 
2001, EIA "The 
Changing Structure of 
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MUNI*POST 1992 Dummy equal to one for MUNI 
plants in years 1993-1999. 
the Electric Power 
Industry: 2000 An 
Update," NARUC 
"Utility Regulatory 
Policy in the United 
States and Canada, 
Compilation" 1994 - 
1995 and 1995 – 96, 
"Restructuring the 
Electricity Industry," 
The Council of State 
Governments, 1999, 
and State PUC 
websites, relevant 
legislation and reports. 
IOU*HIGH NUGS Dummy equal to one beginning 
in 1993 for IOU plants in states 
with above median penetration 
of NUG plants in 1993. 
EIA Electric Power 
Annual. 
BOTH Interaction of 
RESTRUCTURED and HIGH 
NUGS dummy variables. 
 
CHEAP(EXPENSIVE) Dummy indicating whether plant 
average residual from input use 
regression for 1981-1992 period 
is below (above) zero. 
 
INDEPENDENT / OTHER VARIABLES  
PLANT AGE Number of years since the oldest 
unit at the plant came on line. 
UDI 
FGD Dummy equal to 1 indicating the 
operation of a FGD scrubber at 
the plant. 
UDI 
CAPACITY FACTOR Capacity factor of the plant, 
calculated as (NET MWH) / 
(GROSS MW * hours in year) 
UDI 
LN_WAGE State-level annual wage bill 
divided by total employment at 
plants in the following 
industries: SIC 4923-4925 
(natural gas distribution), 4953 
(hazardous waste treatment), 
2911 (petroleum refining). 
BLS 
STATE SALES State-level utility sales in 
gigawatthours, not including 
non-utility sales. 
Sales: Sales to 
Ultimate Customers 
from EIA's "Electric 
Sales and Revenue" 
Table 6 and EIA's 
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"Electric Power 
Annual" Tables 117 
and 90.  
PLANT CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES  
LOAD TYPE Based on the load type reported 
in FERC Form 1 through 1992. 
We assign plants to the last load 
type reported if they change load 
type no more than twice, 
otherwise we do not assign load 
types to missing data years. We 
use this cutoff to include plants 
had a "stray" change--one peak,  
cycle or shutdown type in the 
middle of a string of "base" 
types, for example. 
UDI 
FUEL TYPE Based on the primary fuel burned 
at the plant 
UDI 
BIG Dummy variable equal to one if 
the plant capacity (Gross MW) is 
greater than 550MW. 
UDI 
OLD Dummy equal to one if the 
youngest unit at the plant came 
in service before 1960. 
UDI 
ECONOMIC AND WEATHER VARIABLES  
ANNUAL_UNEMPLOYMENT Annual average unemployment 
in the state.  
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
ANNUAL_HDDAYS Population weighted heating 
degree days for each state-year. 
(use MD for DC) 
ANNUAL_CDDAYS Population weighted cooling 
degree days for each state-year. 
(use MD for DC) 
U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce National 
Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
Historical Climatology 
Series, “Monthly State, 
Regional, and National 
Heating Degree Days 
Weighted By 
Population” 
Note: UDI stands for the Utility Data Institute O&M Production Cost Database. All data in the UDI 
production cost data bases are extracted from the FERC Form 1 (filed by investor-owned utilities), 
EIA Form 412 (filed by municipal and other government utilities), and RUS Form 7 & 12 (filed by 
electric cooperatives). These are annual reports. 
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Data Appendix - Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
LN_NONFUELEXP 10645 15.880 1.137 9.674 18.694
LN_EMPLOYEES 10645 4.562 1.108 0 7.099
LN_BTU 10645 30.304 1.631 19.839 33.067
LN_NET MWH 10645 14.075 1.760 5.476 16.905
PLANTAGE 10645 27.925 12.940 0 76.000
FGD 10645 0.124 0.330 0 1
LN_WAGE 10645 10.543 0.255 9.815 11.488
IOU 10645 0.805 0.396 0 1
MUNI 10645 0.195 0.396 0 1
IOU*RESTRUCTURED 10645 0.107 0.309 0 1
MUNI*RESTRUCTURED 10645 0.013 0.113 0 1
IOU*LAW PASSED 10645 0.081 0.272 0 1
IOU*RETAIL ACCESS 10645 0.007 0.085 0 1
MUNI* POST 1992 10645 0.074 0.262 0 1
IOU*HI NUGS 10645 0.103 0.304 0 1
BIG 10645 0.500 0.500 0 1
OLD 10645 0.476 0.499 0 1
LN_STATE SALES 10645 11.171 0.850 8.285 12.627
ANNUAL_UNEMP 10645 0.064 0.021 0.022 0.180
ANNUAL_CDDAYS 10608 1439.436 931.661 81 3879
ANNUAL_HDDAYS 10608 4382.568 2144.882 414 10758
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Technical Appendix:  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Robustness of results to alternative instruments 
The conclusion that same-plant input use declined after restructuring for IOU plants appears robust to a 
variety of alternative specifications, although the precise magnitude of the estimated efficiency gain depends 
crucially on the estimated relationship between inputs and output.  In tables T1 and T2, we analyze the 
sensitivity of the results to alternative output specifications and instrument sets, using the basic IV 
specification of the regression model (similar to column 4 of tables 4 and 5).     
 
In the first column of each table, we report results that interact the coefficient on output with variables 
indicating whether the plant achieved a high or low output relative to its historical performance.  We use a 
cut-off between high and low output levels based on the 60th percentile of the plant’s historical output, 
although specifications using cutoffs ranging from the 10th to the 80th percentile yielded qualitatively similar 
results.  Introducing this flexibility could be important if fixed labor and materials costs cannot be scaled 
back when the plant operates at historically low output levels.  The results in column (1) suggest that the 
relationship between output and employment (table T1) or output and nonfuel expense (table T2) is not 
materially different across output levels, however.  
 
 Columns 2 through 4 of tables T1 and T2 introduce an array of nonlinearities in the instrument set.  In 
column (2), we add the square of ln(STATESALES) as an instrument.  This allows extreme departures from 
state average sales to have an additional predictive effect on plant output.50  Column (3) adds an interaction 
term between ln(STATESALES) and RETAIL ACCESS, allowing the relation between state demand and plant 
output to vary after implementation of retail access. 51    Column (4) interacts ln(STATESALES)  with fuel 
type indicator variables, allowing the plant output to respond differentially to state demand depending upon 
fuel type.  For employment, reported in table T1, these instrument sets almost all increase the estimated 
magnitude of the coefficient on ln(NET MWhs) relative to the specifications reported in Table 4.  The 
restructuring effect remains negative and statistically significant, although smaller than reported in Table 4.  
For non-fuel expenses, reported in table T2, these changes in the instrument set have varying effects on the 
estimated magnitude of the output elasticity as well as the impact of restructuring, relative to results in Table 
5.  Efficiency effects remain large relative to municipal plants in all specifications, and roughly the 
 
50 In the first stage, the coefficient on state sales is significant, although the F-statistic on the hypothesis that both 
ln(STATESALES) and ln(STATESALES)2 are equal to zero is smaller than the F-statistic from a specification that just 
uses ln(STATESALES).   
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magnitude of those found in table 5 with respect to IOU plants in non-restructuring regimes, with the 
exception of results in column (3).   
 
The final two columns of tables T1 and T2 use lagged values of output as instruments.  This follows 
discussions in Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) on the use of lagged values of endogenous variables in 
applications to input demand and production function specifications, particularly in the case of weak 
exogenous instruments.52   In our case, lagged values of output are very highly correlated with output in all 
specifications, even those estimated using first differences, although first differences may not be appropriate 
given that most plants have scheduled major outages for equipment maintenance and overhauls on a two to 
four year cycle.   We explore two variations.  The simplest, in column (5), uses the prior year output as an 
instrument.  We report results from this as a base, though this is valid only if there is no first-order serial 
correlation in the time-varying efficiency shock, unlikely given the estimated rho in our data.   The second 
variation uses lags from years two through four years before the current.  For employment, this instrument 
set substantially reduces, or eliminates (Table 11, column 6)  the estimated efficiency gain of restructuring 
relative to nonrestructuring IOU plants, though the performance gain relative to MUNIs remains large.  The 
column (6) results also suggest a coefficient on output that is much higher than in any other specifications.  
In the case of non-fuel expenses, these instruments suggest results for restructuring effects that are broadly 
consistent with our other results.   
 
Robustness of results to including forward-looking output 
We have explored specifications that allow for a fixed cost of changing input levels, particularly 
employment. 53  This could cause a plant that foresaw declining output over a several year period, for 
instance accompanying restructuring, to ratchet employment in a discrete change.  If this were the case, the 
plant would appear especially unproductive prior to an employment reduction, and especially productive 
following the reduction until the lower output levels are realized.  To investigate the effect of dynamic 
considerations on our results, we estimated input demand equations that included variables measuring the 
forward looking changes in output. 54  The coefficient on the forward looking changes in output were positive 
and statistically significant in the OLS specifications similar to those in columns (3) of tables 4 and 5, but 
 
51 In the first stage, the coefficient on the interaction term is highly significant. 
52 In fact, Blundell and Bond describe instrumenting with lagged values in a common factor model that allows for a 
first-order auto-regressive term and is first-differenced to eliminate firm-specific effects.  We have estimated this form 
of the model and the results seem to yield an AR(1) term that is over 1.6.   For the reasons discussed in the text, we 
don’t think our data have a simple first-order autoregressive error structure. 
53 There is an extensive labor literature on the presence of fixed costs and other non-convexities in employment 
decisions. 
 
Technical Appendix – page 3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero once we instrumented for both output and forward 
changes in output.  In both cases, the coefficients on our restructuring variables were virtually unchanged. 
 
54 This input demand equation is based on one derived by Rota (2004), who specifies a dynamic model where firms 
face a fixed cost to changing their employment levels. 
Table T1:   Results Using Alternative Instruments – ln(EMPLOYEES) 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments:      ln(STATESALES) 
spline 
ln(STATESALES), 
ln(STATESALES)2
ln(STATESALES) 
ln(STATESALES) 
*RETAIL 
ACCESS 
ln(STATESALES)
X 
Fuel-type  
ln(NET 
MWhs)t-1
ln(NET MWhs)t-2, 
ln(NET MWhs)t-3, 
ln(NET MWhs)t-4
-0.050**      -0.041* -0.050** -0.035 -0.028 0.007IOU* 
RESTRUCTURED (0.022)      (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
0.091***      0.094*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.080*** 0.086***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.025)      (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
-0.107**      -0.093** -0.108** -0.087** -0.087** -0.083ln(WAGE) 
(0.045)      (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.051)
     0.094 0.048 0.121** 0.152*** 0.330***ln(NET MWH ) 
      (0.083) (0.057) (0.058) (0.017) (0.075)
0.026      ln(NET MWH ) 
*HIGH CF (0.118)      
0.024      ln(NET MWH ) 
*LOW CF (0.122)      
Observations 10634      10634 10634 10634 9377 6573
Plant-epoch and year fixed effects included. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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Table T2:   Results Using Alternative Instruments – ln(NON-FUEL EXPENSES) 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments:      ln(STATESALES) 
spline 
ln(STATESALES), 
ln(STATESALES)2
ln(STATESALES), 
ln(STATESALES) 
*RETAIL ACCESS 
ln(STATESALES)
X 
Fuel-type  
ln(NET 
MWhs)t-1
ln(NET MWhs)t-2, 
ln(NET MWhs)t-3, 
ln(NET MWhs)t-4
-0.059**     -0.051* -0.024 -0.056** -0.083*** -0.061**IOU* 
RESTRUCTURED (0.029)      (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025)
0.170***      0.147*** 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.123*** 0.115***MUNI*POST 1992 
(0.029)      (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
      0.398*** 0.528*** 0.374*** 0.271*** 0.445***ln(NET MWH) 
      (0.083) (0.073) (0.078) (0.023) (0.098)
0.570***      ln(NET MWH)* 
HIGH CF (0.152)      
0.586***      ln(NET MWH ) 
*LOW CF (0.157)      
Observations 10645 10645     10645 10645 9386 6580
Plant-epoch and year fixed effects included. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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